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Adieu to Electrocution
DEBORAH W. DENNO °
In Bryan v. Moore,' the United States Supreme Court rewrote a part of
death penalty history. For the first time ever, the Court granted certiorari to
review arguments concerning whether execution by electrocution in any
state-in this case Florida-violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.2 The Court ultimately dismissed its certiorari
grant in light of the Florida legislature's decision to switch to lethal injection.'
Bryan also fueled comparable constitutional challenges in the two remaining
electrocution states, Alabama and Nebraska.' Within moments of legal time,
the Millennium will bid electrocution adieu.
Much has been written about why electrocution has persisted so
stubbornly over the course of the twentieth century.5 This Article focuses
* ProfessorofLaw, Fordham UniversitySchoolofLaw. B.A., 1974, UniversityofVirginia; M.A.,
1975, University of Toronto; Ph.D., 1982, J.D., 1989, University of Pennsylvania. I am most grateful for
the very helpful comments and advice provided by Bruce Green, Edward Chikofsky, and Hunter Labovitz;
however, these individuals are not responsible for my mistakes. I give special thanks to Juan Fernandez
for his superb work in tabulating all the data that this Article analyzes, and for creating Tables 1-4 and 7-8.
I also thank Greg Drevenstedt for initially creating Tables 5-6, and James Mowbray for offering
information on Nebraska's execution method status. On March 24, 2000, I presented an early versiofi of
this Article at the Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University Law Review Symposium on
"The Ultimate Penalty: A Multifarous Look at Capital Punishment." An early version of this Article also
formed the basis of the amicus brief filed in Bryan v. Moore, 120 S. Ct. 394 (1999), by Fordham Law
School's Stein Center for Law and Ethics, and several other parties. See 1999 WL 1249430 (Amicus.
Brief), Bryan v. Moore, 120 S. Ct. 394 (1999).
I. 120 S. Ct. 394 (1999).
2. See id.; see also Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82
IOWA L. REV. 319, 321 (1997) (emphasizing that "It]he United States Supreme Court has never reviewed
evidence concerning whether any particular execution method is unconstitutional and has rarely even
broached the issue").
3. See Bryan v. Moore, 120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000); 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 00-2 (West).
4. See infra app. tbl.1. After Bryan, the Court denied certiorari to review the Supreme Court of
Alabama's finding that electrocution was constitutional. See Tarver v. Alabama, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000).
Regardless, the Alabama legislature is considering two bills proposing that lethal injection be the state's
major means of execution. See Justices Block an Execution in Alabama's Electric Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2000, at AI2. In addition, a Nebraska district court held that the way electrocution has been applied in
Nebraska (using fourjolts instead of one long jolt), is unconstitutional. See State v. Mata, No. CR 99-52,
Memorandum Order (D. Neb. May 8,2000); see also Kim Cobb, Judges'Ruling CouldEnd Use of Electric
Chair in Nebraska, HOuS. CHtRON., May 10, 2000, at 7. The constitutionality of Nebraska's electric chair
will be a primary focus of Raymond Mata's appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court. See Todd Von
Kampen, Death Sentence for Mata; His Attorneys Plan in TheirAppeal to Challenge the Constitutionality
of Nebraska's Use of the Electric Chair, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 2, 2000, at 1.
5. For summaries of the literature, see Denno, supra note 2, at 319, and Deborah W. Denno, Is
Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineering of Death Over the Century,
35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 551 (1994).
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briefly on more recent developments concerning why electrocution should be
abolished entirely.6 Part I of this Article describes the facts and circumstances
surrounding Bryan as well as Bryan's unusual world-wide notice due to the
gruesome photos of the executed Allen Lee Davis posted on the Internet. Part
II focuses on the sociological and legal history of electrocution, most
particularly the inappropriate precedential impact of In re Kemmler.7 In
Kemmler, the Court found the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to the states
and deferred to the New York legislature's determination that electrocution
was not cruel and unusual.' Regardless, Kemmler has been cited repeatedly
as Eighth Amendment support for electrocution despite Kemmler's lack of
modern scientific and legal validity. Part III concludes that, under the Court's
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, electrocution is unconstitutional
according to four criteria: (1) the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,"9 (2) "physical violence" and an affront to "human dignity,"1 (3) the risk
of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"" and (4) "evolving standards
of decency."12
Alabama and Nebraska remain the only electrocution states, after a steep
decline over the decades in the number of states that have used electrocution
in this country. 3 This Article contends that there is no moral or legal reason
to retain electrocution, particularly because other execution methods are
available. It is clear that at some point soon, electrocution will no longer exist
in this country and, as a result, throughout the world. By eliminating this
perplexing vestige, the other problems with the death penalty may appear all
that more offensive.
6. The impetus for this Article stems from my involvement as an expert in a number of cases
challenging the constitutionality of electrocution, including some earlier Florida cases that paved the way
for Bryan. See Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997); Buenoano v. State, 565 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1990).
7. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
8. See id. at 446, 449.
9. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
10. Id. at 1085; see generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
11. Glass, 471 U.S. at 1084.
12. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 269-70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
13. See infra app. tbls. 1-3; Death Penalty Information Center, Authorized Methods of Execution by
State (visited July 3, 2000) <http://www.essential.orgJorgs/dpic/methods.html>.
666 [Vol. 26
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I. A FLORIDA ELECTROCUTION GARNERS WORLD-WIDE NOTICE
On July 8, 1999, Allen Lee Davis' execution in Florida's electric chair
gained worldwide notice and condenation. 4 The Florida Supreme Court's
color photos of the executed Davis, posted on the Internet, received so many
"hits" from the several millions of interested viewers that the court's
computer system crashed and was disabled for months afterwards. 5
The photos and witnesses' testimony indicated that Davis suffered a
nose bleed that poured down his shirt, that he evidenced deep burns on his
head, face, and body, and that he was partially asphyxiated before and during
the electrocution from the five-inch-wide mouth strap that belted him to the
chair's head-rest. 6 There was also testimony that after guards placed the
mouth strap on him, Davis' face became red and he made sounds in an effort
to get the guards' attention. 7  Witnesses described Davis' sounds as"'screams,' 'yells,' 'moans,' 'high-pitched murmurs,' 'squeals,' or 'groans,'
or like 'a scream with someone having something over their--their mouth.""...
Those execution team members who heard Davis' noises "ignored them
because they were not unusual during an electrocution."' 9  In the post-
execution photos taken by Department of Corrections personnel,
a sponge placed under [Davis'] head-piece obscures the entire top
portion of his head down to his eyebrows; because of the width of the
mouth-strap, only a small portion of Davis' face is visible above the
mouth-strap and below the sponge, and that portion is bright purple
and scrunched tightly upwards; his eyes are clenched shut and his
nose is pushed so severely upward that it is barely visible above the
mouth-strap.)
14. See Amnesty Calls for Death Penalty Abolition, Following Grisly Execution, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, July 8,1999, at 1; Joe Carroll, US Death Sentence Ruling Defies Ratified UN Treaty, IRISH TIMES,
Nov. 3,1999, at 12; Roberta Harrington, Death Penalty Debate Sparked, SUNDAY HERALD, Nov. 28, 1999,
at 16; Julie Hauserman, Lethal Injection Signed into Law, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan.1 5, 2000, at A 1;
Madrid Demonstrators Protest Death Sentence, PRESS J. (Florida), Nov. 3, 1999, at A 1; Millions Flock
to US Execution Site, SCOTSMAN, Nov. 1, 1999, at 22; Michael Peltier, Death Pictures Pique Interest
Worldwide, PRESS J. (Florida), Oct. 25, 1999, at AS; David Usborne, Is the End in View for Old Sparky?,
INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 9, 2000, at 20.
15. See Usborne, supra note 14, at 20; Millions Flock to US Execution Site, supra note 14, at 22;
Peltier, supra note 14, at AS.
16. See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 433-34 (Fla. 1999) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
17. See id. at 433.
18. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bryan v. Moore, 120 S. Ct. 394 (1999) (No. 99-6723) (citations
omitted).
19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. Provenzano, 744 So. 2d at 434 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
2000]
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Thomas Provenzano, who was scheduled to be executed in the Florida
State Prison the next day, filed a petition with the Florida Supreme Court
seeking a stay of execution, arguing that the state's electric chair was cruel
and unusual punishment." The Florida Supreme Court remanded
Provenzano' s case to the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the
constitutionality of Florida's electric chair.22 After the hearing, the circuit
court held that electrocution in Florida's electric chair "is not
unconstitutional. ' 23 In Provenzano v. Moore,24 a 4-3 per curiam opinion, a
plurality of the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, in three pages, the circuit
court's "finding that the electric chair is not unconstitutional. 25 Moreover,
the plurality reiterated its previous holding in Jones v. State26 which had
rejected the claim that Florida's use of electrocution violated "evolving
standards of decency."27 The court implied there was no need to readdress the
"evolving standards of decency" issue.
In granting certiorari to review the issue in Bryan v. Moore,' the Court
defied history and expectations. Yet, it was also unclear why the Court made
such a move after all these years. There were a range of possible views: (1)
the Court wanted to declare electrocution constitutional once and for all to en4
the seemingly ceaseless stream of appeals challenging the method's
constitutionality over the years; (2) the Court wanted to examine the
constitutionality of Allen Lee Davis' execution in particular, in light of
Florida's history of botched executions; or (3) the Court wanted to examine
whether electrocution in general, as well as applied specifically in Florida,
was constitutional. This span of possible perspectives necessitated a
sufficiently broad focus for challenging the constitutionality of electrocution,
beginning with the method's history.
II. ELECTROCUTION WARRANTS RECONSIDERATION UNDER MODERN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT STANDARDS
When the United States Constitution was being ratified, the Framers
included in the Bill of Rights a prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
created expressly to proscribe the kinds of "torturous" and "barbarous"
21. See id. at 413-15.
22. See id. at 413-14.
23. Id. at 414-15.
24. Id. at 413 (per curiam).
25. Id. at416.
26. 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997).
27. Provenzano, 744 So. 2d at 415.
28. 120 S. Ct. 394 (1999).
[Vol. 26
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penalties associated with certain methods of execution. 9 To date, however,
courts generally have provided only superficial Eighth Amendment review of
the constitutionality of execution methods, particularly electrocution. Most
commonly, courts dismiss the electrocution challenge entirely (often in one
sentence) by relying on the century-old precedent of In re Kemmler.3" In
Kemmler, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the
states and deferred to the New York legislature's conclusion that electrocution
was not a cruel and unusual punishment under the state's Electrical Execution
Act.3
For a range of reasons, Kemmler's precedential value has diminished
substantially over the last century. First, the Kemmler Court never specifically
employed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause even though post-
incorporation cases have continued mistakenly to cite Kemmler as an Eighth
Amendment case.32 Next, the Kemmler Court adopted the burden of proof
promulgated by the New York court that required the prisoner to show
"beyond doubt" that the execution method was cruel and unusual.33 However,
this standard has not been used since Kemmler in death penalty cases.
Although courts, such as Provenzano v. Moore,3 typically fail to identify the
burden of proof when reviewing the constitutionality of execution methods,
the burden of proof courts cite most frequently-preponderance of the
evidence-is far less stringent.3 5 Moreover, a court reviewing electrocution
under the Eighth Amendment would not defer to the state's legislature to the
extent the Court did when deciding Kemmler.36 Most critically, Kemmler was
29. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. 136 U.S. 436 (1890); see also Denno, supra note 5, at 616-23; Denno, supra note 2, at 333-54.
31. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442-43.
32. See Denno, supra note 2, at 334. For examples of cases that incorrectly state that Kemmler
analyzed and applied the Eighth Amendment, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,299 (1987), Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1031 (2d Cir. 1973), Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203,218 (D. Md. 1979), and
Thompson v. State, 542 So. 2d 1286, 1298 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
33. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442.
34. 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam).
35. See Denno, supra note 2, at 335; see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649-51 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (upholding Arizona's imposition on defendants the burden of establishing, "by a
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency" in order to avoid the death penalty after the establishment of one or more aggravating factors);
Blake v. Hall, 668 F.2d 52, 57 (1 st Cir. 1981) (determining that plaintiffs had failed to establish by "'a fair
preponderance of the evidence"' that cell conditions at a prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment);
McGill v. Duckworth, 726 F. Supp. 1144, 114849 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (discussing the applicability of the
preponderance of the evidence standard in suits against prison officials for failing to protect a prison inmate
from attack by another inmate); Martin v. Foti, 561 F. Supp. 252,257 (E.D. La. 1983) (noting that plaintiffs
had "failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence" that conditions were cruel and unusual).
36. See Kemmiler, 136 U.S. at 442-43 (quoting the New York Supreme Court's explanation of why
it deferred to the legislature).
20001
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decided before anyone had been electrocuted; therefore, the Court had limited
evidence in reaching its conclusion."7 Historical analyses suggest that
Kemmler was based in large part on the law, science, and politics of the time
as well as the .particular uncertainties resulting from the passage of New
York's Electrocution Act.38
Both legally and scientifically, then, Kemmler's 1890 electrocution was
a human experiment. By all accounts, the experiment failed. In graphic
detail, the media reported the confusion, mistakes, and physical violence that
resulted from Kemmler's execution. 39 Regardless, electrocution became a
popular means of execution in other states, which also reported mishaps and
botches.' Seemingly, the desire to perpetuate the death penalty outweighed
any humanitarian goal to switch to a new method.4"
The Kemmler Court's factual assumptions regarding the acceptability of
electrocution have no support in light of modem evidence of electrocution's
effects on the human body.42 One of the Kemmler Court's legal conclusions,
37. See Far Worse Than Hanging, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1890, at 1 (explaining that William
Kemmler was the first person to be executed by electricity).
38. The events surrounding Kemmiler suggest that political and financial forces outweighed the
purported humanitarian concerns. For example, the New York Electrocution Act was a direct result of the
Governor of New York's 1885 message to the legislature decrying the barbarity of hanging and his
appointment of a Commission to investigate "'the most humane and practical method known to modern
science"' of carrying out executions. Denno, supra note 5, at 567 (citations omitted). Yet, compelling
evidence suggests that the Commission's ultimate recommendation of electrocution as the most humane
method of effecting death was influenced heavily by a financial competition between Thomas Edison and
George Westinghouse concerning whose current would dominate the electrical industry: Edison's DC
current or Westinghouse's AC current. See id. at 568-73. Edison and his associates would have benefitted
by showing that George Westinghouse's AC current was so lethal it could kill someone. See id. at 571.
If AC current were used in the electric chair, people would be afraid to use the current in their own homes.
See id. Indeed, this Edison-Westinghouse rivalry existed within and throughout the New York Supreme
Court's evidentiary hearings. See generally id. at 568-77. Edison testified that death by electrocution
would be quick and painless and that electricity would not mutilate the victim's body. See id. at 580; cf
CRAIG BRANDON, TlE ELEcTRIc CHAIR: AN UNNATURAL AMERICAN HISTORY 82 (1999). In contrast,
Westinghouse reportedly financed William Kemmler's appeal at a cost exceeding $100,000. See Denno,
supra note 5, at 578. Both Edison and Westinghouse also relied on a series of experiments testing the
effects of electrocution on animals, albeit emphasizing differing results. See id at 574; see generally
BRANDON, supra, at 75-88. Yet, despite a cross examination demonstrating Edison's ignorance of the
effects of electrical currents on the human body as well as experimental results showing that electrocution
did not quickly kill many of the animals tested, Edison's enormous reputation at the time outweighed
revelation of his or any other expert's substantive flaws. See Denno, supra note 5, at 570. The New York
legislature adopted electrocution and, with time, the medical community recommended AC current in
particular. See id. at 572-77. For further details surrounding this controversy, see BRANDON, supra, at 7-
159; Denno supra note 5, at 562-604.
39. See, e.g., Far Worse Than Hanging, supra note 37, at 1.
40. See BRANDON, supra note 38, at 205-57; Denno, supra note 5, at 624-76.
41. See Denno, supra note 2, at 388-94.
42. See, e.g., Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931, 933 (1993) (Souter, J., joined by Blackmun and
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however, remains viable: "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death .... [Slomething more than the mere extinguishment oflife. '43
Regardless of the problems with electrocution, the Court relied on
Kemmler in Malloy v. South Carolina," to conclude that the State's
implementation of death through electrocution, rather than hanging, did not
increase the punishment of murder but only changed its mode. 5 Thirty-two
years later in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,4 the issue was not
whether electrocution was per se unconstitutional, but whether the State of
Louisiana could constitutionally execute the appellant after the electric chair
had malfunctioned during the first attempt.47 In examining the circumstances
of Francis "under the assumption, but without so deciding" that the Eighth
Amendment applied, 4 a plurality of four Justices interpreted the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause as prohibiting only the "inflict[ion of]
unnecessary pain," not the suffering created in an "unforeseeable accident. ' 49
The Justices thus assumed that state officials performed "their duties... in a
careful and humane manner."5° Justice Frankfurter explained, however, that
his deciding fifth vote did "not mean that a hypothetical situation, which
assumes a series of abortive attempts at electrocution... would not raise
different questions.""
Since 1962, when the Court held in Robinson v. California52 that the
Eighth Amendment applies to the states, the Court's Eighth Amendment
doctrine has emphasized an "evolving standard of decency" of cruel and
unusual punishment.53 This evolution occurs because "[t]ime... brings into
existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital,
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.", 4
Stevens, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari) (emphasizing that Kemmler was not "a dispositive response to
litigation of the issue [of the constitutionality of electrocution] in light of modern knowledge").
43. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
44. 237 U.S. 180(1915).
45. See id. at 185.
46. 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (plurality opinion).
47. See id. at 461.
48. Id. at 462.
49. Id. at 464.
50. Id. at 462.
51. Id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
52. 370 U.S. 660,666 (1962). In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Douglas relied
on both Robinson and Francis to conclude that the Eighth Amendment's applicability to the states is "now
settled." Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Denno, supra note 2, at 337.
53. See Denno, supra note 2, at 337-38; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,369 (1989);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
54. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
2000]
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For these reasons, the Court has viewed the Eighth Amendment "in a flexible
and dynamic manner,"" recognizing that the Clause "draw[s] its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. ' 6 Current claims of cruel and unusual punishment must therefore be
assessed "in the light of contemporary human knowledge.""7
Consistent with the "evolving standards of decency" and Kemmler's
"torture and lingering death" standards, the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence suggests four interrelated criteria for determining the
constitutionality of an execution method: (1) "the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain," (2) "nothing less than" human dignity (e.g., "a
minimization of physical violence during execution"), (3) the risk of
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and (4) "evolving standards of
decency" as measured by "objective factors to the maximum extent possible,"
such as legislation passed by elected representatives or public attitudes."8
In Provenzano, the Florida Supreme Court's skeletal per curiam opinion
virtually ignored the great bulk of the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court effectively begged the
question of electrocution's continued propriety under an "evolving standards
of decency" test. Indeed, no court has reviewed the constitutionality of
electrocution under modem Eighth Amendment standards which consider, as
a substantial part of an "evolving standards of decency" analysis, legislative
trends and related information, such as public opinion polls.
M. A MODERN EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT
EXECUTION BY ELECTROCUTION CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
Under the Court's modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, pain is only
one of a range of factors suggesting that an execution by electrocution
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. This section discusses briefly the
pain and physical violence of electrocution, but then focuses on other Eighth
Amendment criteria, most particularly the strong showing of legislative trends
away from electrocution.
55. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 (quoting Gregg. v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)).
56. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
57. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
58. See Denno, supra note 2, at 321-402 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 26
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A. Electrocution Constitutes "Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of
Pain"
The most recent research and eyewitness observations suggest that many
factors associated with electrocution, such as severe burning, boiling body
fluids, asphyxiation, and cardiac arrest, can cause extreme pain when
unconsciousness is not instantaneous.59 Table 8' provides brief summaries
of nineteen botched electrocutions following Gregg v. Georgia,61 when the
Court ended its moratorium on the death penalty. 62 These botches provide
considerable evidence of extensive pain and suffering experienced by
electrocuted prisoners. Notably, even a routine or "properly performed"
electrocution can cause intense pain and a lingering death.63
B. Electrocution Constitutes "Physical Violence" and Offends "Human
Dignity"
Evidence of mutilation resulting from electrocution is derived from three
sources: post-execution autopsies, which are required in some states;
observations provided by experts; and witnesses' descriptions of executions,
some of which are detailed in Table 8.6 The effects of electrocution on the
human body include the following: charring of the skin and severe external
burning, such as the possible burning away of the ear; exploding of the penis;
defecation and micturition, which necessitate that the condemned person wear
a diaper; drooling and vomiting; blood flowing from facial orifices; intense
muscle spasms and contractions; odors resulting from the burning of the skin
and the body; and extensive sweating and swelling of skin tissue.65
Similar to Allen Lee Davis' execution, for example, the execution of
Wilbert Lee Evans in Virginia resulted in substantial bleeding.6 According
to accounts by witnesses and reporters, blood poured from Evans' eyes and
nose, drenching his shirt.67 Moreover, the flames witnessed during the 1990
execution of Jesse Joseph Tafero and the 1997 execution of Pedro Medina
59. See id. at 354-58 (summarizing available medical publications, eyewitness reports, and affidavit
testimony).
60. Infra app. tbl.8.
61. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
62. See id. at 168-207.
63. See Sherwin B. Nuland, Cruel and Unusual, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 9, 1999, at A25 ("Even when
it functions exactly as it should, the electric chair is a brutal killer."); see generally SHERWIN B. NULAND,
How WE DiE: REFLECrnONS ON LIFE'S FINAL CHA PER (1994) (discussing different methods of death and
the pain associated with them).
64. Infra app. tbl.8.
65. See Denno, supra note 2, at 359.
66. See id. at 419-20.
67. See id.
2000]
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made the public explicitly aware of how a human body could be burned and
distorted during an electrocution.6"
C. Electrocution Constitutes the Risk of "Unnecessary and Wanton
Infliction of Pain"
When legislatures or courts validate the use of electrocution, they
presume that prison officials will carry out executions properly and that
equipment will not malfunction. A focus on electrocutions in all states and
over time, however, reveals the potential for prison personnel's contribution
to a risk of unnecessary pain.
In 1990, for example, the botched electrocution of Jesse Joseph Tafero
in Florida suggested there was a substantial likelihood that the state's
execution procedure could result in severe pain and prolonged agony.69
Subsequently, a pattern of consecutive malfunctions has been established
with the botched electrocution of Pedro Medina and, now, James Allen
Davis.70 Tafero's and Medina's executions shared similar problems (most
particularly difficulties with the headset sponge), that created the flames,
smoke, smell, and burning in both executions.71 Ironically, Tafero's and
Medina's executions closely resembled William Kemmler's over a century
ago. The fact that a new and additional set of problems accompanied the
execution of James Allen Davis suggests that a continuing pattern of botches
is highly foreseeable. Indeed, a pattern of consecutive botching also occurred
in Virginia even after the state rewired the electric chair due to prior
botching.72 These problems prompted Virginia to allow inmates a choice
between electrocution and lethal injection.73
D. Electrocution Contravenes "Evolving Standards of Decency"
"Evolving standards of decency" can be measured by legislative trends
regarding the imposition of a particular punishment. A thorough assessment
should consider legislative changes in execution methods over the course of
the twentieth century, starting with the New York legislature's 1888 selection
of electrocution.74
68. See infra app. tbl.8.
69. See Denno, supra note 2, at 417-18.
70. See id at 423; infra app. tbl.8; Death Penalty Information Center, Post-Furman Botched
Executions (visited July 3, 2000) <http://www.essential.org./orgs/dpic/botched.html>.
71. See Denno, supra note 2, at 418, 424; infra app. tbl.8.
72. See Denno, supra note 2, at 362 & n.262.
73. See id. at 462; infra app. tbls.l & 3.
74. See Denno, supra note 2, at 363-408, 439-64; infra app. tbls.2 & 3.
[Vol. 26
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In general, three themes emerge from an 1888-1999 overview of
legislative trends in the use of the five available methods of execution in the
United States: hanging, firing squad, electrocution, lethal gas, and lethal
injection.75 First, most state legislatures purport to change from one method
of execution to another, or to a "choice" between a state's old method of
execution and lethal injection, for humanitarian reasons, although other
factors, such as cost, can also be influential. Second, legislatures evidence a
fairly consistent pattern of movement from one method of execution to
another, suggesting that states take notice of the methods used and the
difficulties encountered, by other states. Third, since 1977, when lethal
injection was first introduced, no state has changed to or included as an
additional "choice," any other method of execution but lethal injection.76 In
general, states' changes in execution methods have occurred in the following
order: from hanging to electrocution to lethal gas to lethal injection." The
firing squad has been used sporadically in only a few states.78
In 1853, hanging, the "nearly universal form of execution," was used in
forty-eight "states" (many were still considered territories at that time).79
Nearly four decades later, however, concerns over the barbarity of hanging
and the subsequent advent of electrocution prompted states to change their
method of execution from hanging to electrocution. ° Even though the first
electrocutions were grotesquely botched, by 1913, a total of fifteen states had
changed to electrocution as a result of "a well grounded belief that
electrocution is less painful and more humane than hanging. '"" By 1949,
twenty-six states had changed to electrocution, the largest number of states to
ever use electrocution at the same time. 2 However, since 1949, no state has
selected electrocution as its method of execution 3 In other words, it has been
a half century since any legislature has adopted electrocution as a method of
execution. 4
The gradual cessation of states' adoption of electrocution appears to be
attributable to Nevada's switch in 1921 from hanging and shooting to lethal
75. See infra app. tbl. 1; Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 13.
76. See Denno, supra note 2, at 364.
77. See id. at 364-70, 373-75; infra app. tbis.2 & 3.
78. See Denno, supra note 2, at 439-64; infra app. tbl.1.
79. See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (quoting State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922, 934 (Wash. 198 1)); see also Denno, supra note 2, at
364, 439-64 (revealing that each state at the time of statehood used hanging as a means of execution).
80. See Denno, supra note 2, at 364-.65.
81. Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915).
82. See infra app. tbl.2.
83. See infra app. tbis.2 & 3.
84. See Denno, supra note 2, at 363-408,439-64; infra app. tbls.2 & 3.
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gas in accordance with the state's new Humane Death Bill. 5 By 1955, elevenstates were using lethal gas, and twenty-two states were using electrocution. 86By 1973, twelve states were using lethal gas and twenty states were using
electrocution. 7 Since 1973, however, no state has selected lethal gas as a
method of execution. 8 With each new lethal gas statute came controversy and
constitutional challenges, both before and after the Court's moratorium on
capital punishment in Furman.9 By 1994, there was a national consensus
concluding that lethal gas was not an acceptable method of execution. 90
Recent research indicates that there is an even more striking national
consensus rejecting electrocution. Since 1973, twelve states have abandoned
lethal gas as their exclusive method of execution.9' By contrast, since 1949,
twenty-four states have abandoned electrocution as their exclusive method of
execution.92 Moreover, eight of these states have abandoned electrocution in
the last five years.93
There are historical differences between the uses of electrocution and
lethal gas that point to states' initial, relative reluctance, to reject
electrocution. First, over the course of the century, states have relied on
Kemmler to support the retention of electrocution whereas no Supreme Court
case has addressed the constitutionality of lethal gas.' Next, electrocution
was introduced three decades earlier than lethal gas during a time when
science was substantially less advanced; therefore, lethal gas, which was also
a considerably more visible method than electrocution, had the advantage of
greater immediate scrutiny.95 Nonetheless, electrocution and lethal gas have
comparable "legislative lifelines" (61 years and 51 years, respectively) in
terms of the point at which they were introduced and the point at which they
were no longer adopted. This similarity suggests comparable periods of
tolerance (electrocution was first introduced in 1888 and last adopted in 1949;
lethal gas was first introduced in 1921 and last adopted in 1973).96 Last, lethal
gas is more expensive than electrocution, a factor that states have
acknowledged when they have changed execution methods.97
85. See Denno, supra note 2, at 366.
86. See id. at 367.
87. See id. at 405.
88. See id. at 367; infra app. tbl.3.
89. 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972).
90. See Denno, supra note 2, at 368; infra app. tbl.3.
91. See Denno, supra note 2, at 405.
92. See id.; infra app. tbls.2 & 3.
93. See infra app. tbl.3.
94. See Denno, supra note 2, at 370 n.298.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
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Recent trends also suggest that state legislatures may have reached a
"sufficient" degree of national consensus in rejecting both lethal gas and
electrocution as execution methods.9" Although the Court has never specified
how much of a consensus is considered "sufficient," it has rendered
punishments unconstitutional with far less consensus than that shown for
lethal gas or electrocution.9 In Enmund v. Florida,"° for example, the Court
held the death penalty unconstitutional for some kinds of felony murder,
explaining that of the thirty-six death penalty jurisdictions, only eight, "a
small minority," allowed capital punishment for such an offense."0 '
Furthermore, even if the Court considered along with these eight states an
additional nine jurisdictions that allowed the death penalty for an unintended
felony murder if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating
circumstances, the Court emphasized that still "only abouta third of American
jurisdictions" would allow a defendant to be sentenced to death for such
offenses. 2 The Court noted that even though this trend was not "'wholly
unanimous among state legislatures,' ... it nevertheless weighs on the side
of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue."1"3 In those cases where
the Court has rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to a particular
punishment, there have been far more states employing that particular
punishment than the number of states employing electrocution."
Over time, lethal injection has become the overwhelmingly dominant
method of execution.'0 5  Among those inmates executed by either
electrocution or lethal injection between 1978-79 and 1998-99, 75% were
executed by lethal injection and 25% were executed by electrocution."t° As
the total number of executions from these two methods increased over time
(from one execution in 1978-79 to 156 executions in 1998-99), the percentage
of electrocution executions declined steadily. 7  The percentage of
electrocution executions declined rapidly from 1980-81 to 1986-87 (from
98. See id. at 371.
99. See id.
100. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
101. Id at 792.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 793 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977)); see also Denno, supra note
2, at 371.
104. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (rejecting a challenge to the
constitutionality of the death penalty for 16-year-olds, noting that 22 of the 37 death penalty jurisdictions
allowed capital punishment for such youths); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1989) (rejecting
a challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty for mentally retarded persons, emphasizing that only
two states had prohibited it). See also Denno, supra note 2, at 371 & n.306.
105. See infra app. tbis.4-6.
106. See infra app. tbls.5 & 6.
107. See infra app. tbls.5 & 6.
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100% to 56%), increased briefly in 1988-89 (58%), then declined steadily
thereafter. 0 8  The rapid increase in the percentage of lethal injection
executions can be attributed to the fact that the increases over time in the total
number of executions was driven largely by increases in lethal injection
executions.3 9
There are other issues that bear on "evolving standards of decency." For
example, apart from the United States, no other country in the world uses
electrocution."' Of the four states in this country that used electrocution at
the time Provenzano v. Moore was decided (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and
Nebraska), Florida imposed the most electrocution executions."' Since
Gregg, more than half of the electrocutions in this country, and thus in the
world, have taken place in Florida." 2
Electrocution is also not favored as a method of execution among
respondents in recent public opinion polls. Lethal injection is preferred by
most, if not the great majority, of respondents." 3  Floridians also have
indicated majority support for lethal injection after Davis' execution."'
The Florida Corrections Commission, the body responsible for
overseeing Florida's electric chair, has also recommended that Florida change
to lethal injection." 5 The Commission's survey of execution methods in other
states revealed that "numerous states had recently changed to lethal injection
from electrocution because it was considered to be a 'more humane method
of execution.""'6 Lastly, the Humane Society of the United States and the
American Veterinarian Medical Association consider electrocution a wholly
unacceptable method of euthanasia for animals." 7
In Provenzano v. Moore, the Florida Supreme Court failed to address
these critical "evolving standards of decency" factors." 8 Clearly, a modem
108. See infra app. tbl.5.
109. See infra app. tbls.4-6.
110. See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413,436 (Fla. 1999) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
111. See infra app. tbl.7.
112. See infra app. tbl.7.
113. See Carla McClain,Arizona Gas Chamber Stays, Gannet News Service, Apr. 7,1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Ubrary, Wires File (84% favoring lethal injection); George Skelton, Death Penalty
Support Still Strong in State, LA. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at Al (63% favoring lethal injection).
114. See Poll: State Should Kill by Injection, SENTINEL (Orlando), Nov. 8, 1999, at CI (reporting
the results of an October 1999, statewide poll conducted by The Miami Herald and The St. Petersburg
Times, in which 58% of the 600 people questioned supported a state law to replace the electric chair with
lethal injection). See also Poll: Electric Chair Unpopular in Florida, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 7,
1999, at A22.
115. See Provenzano, 744 So. 2d at436 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 437.
117. See id.at436.
118. See generally id. at 413-22.
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Eighth Amendment analysis of electrocution reveals the court's unjustified
conclusion that electrocution is constitutional.
SUMMARY AND CONCLOSION
The Eighth Amendment was enacted to proscribe "torturous" and
"barbarous" punishments, the penalties most commonly associated with
executions." 9 As yet, however, no court has provided a modem and
comprehensive Eighth Amendment review of any execution method, including
electrocution. In general, courts dismiss constitutional challenges to
electrocution entirely by relying on the outdated precedent of In re
Kemmler.' ° In Kemmler, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not
apply to the states and therefore never addressed directly the constitutionality
of electrocution.' Alternatively, as in Provenzano, courts engage in a brief
Eighth Amendment review that focuses predominantly on the amount of pain
inflicted while ignoring other Eighth Amendment standards.
A modem and comprehensive Eighth Amendment review of medical,
historical, and societal evidence demonstrates that electrocution does not
comport with "evolving standards of decency." Electrocution ififlicts
unnecessary pain and physical violence, and is at risk of continuing to do so
given a demonstrated pattern of botched electrocutions. Moreover, legislative
trends show a clear and consistent break from electrocution. Indeed, there are
only two states that currently apply it (Alabama and Nebraksa). If the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause is applied in the way that it was originally
intended, the Court would find electrocution unconstitutional.
119. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
120. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
121. See id. at 442-43.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
CURRENT METHODS OF EXECUTION BY STATE*
LETHAL INJECTION (25) ELECTROCUTION (2)
Arizona Arkansas California Alabama Nebraska
Colorado Connecticut
Delaware Georgia Illinois
Indiana Kansas Kentucky
Louisiana Maryland
Mississippi Nevada
New Jersey New Mexico
New York Oklahoma Oregon
Pennsylvania South Dakota
Tennessee Texas Wyoming
INJECTION OR HANGING (3)
Montana New Hampshire Washington
INJECTION OR FIRING SQUAD (2)
Idaho Utah
INJECTION OR ELECTROCUTION (4)
Florida Ohio South Carolina Virginia
INJECTION OR GAS (2)
Missouri North Carolina
*Statutory and case law documentation for each state can be found in Denno, supra
note 2, at 439-64; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-
114 (1998); LaGrande v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999) (California and Arizona);
2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 00-2 (West); H. B. 1284, 2000 Sess. (Ga. 2000).
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TABLE 2
CHANGES IN THE USE OF ELECTROCUTION
BY STATE: 1888-1951
Y S HANGING TO ELECTROCUTION ELECTROCUTION
E T ELECTROCUTION TO TO
A A LETHAL GAS LETHAL INJECTION
R T
E
1888 NY NY
1896 OH O
1898 MA INMA
1906 NJ NJ
1908 VA VA
1909 NC N
1910 KY KY
1912 SC Sc
VT VT
AR AR
IN IN
1913 NE
OK OK
PA PA
TN TN
AL AL
1923 FL Fl
TX TX
1924 GA GA
1927 IL H
1929 NM N 1
1935 CT C T
NC
1939 SD SD
1940 LA iA
1949 WV 7 WV
1951 OK ...
NO CHANGE IN C7 IF]N';EI
EXECUTION XECUTIONMETHOD MTO
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TABLE 3
CHANGES IN THE USE OF ELECTROCUTION BY STATE:
1954-2000
HANGING TO
ELECTROCUTION
1954 MS N
1955 NM
1965 VT*
WV*
1977 TX
1982 MA
AR
1983 IL
NJ
1984 MA*
SD
1990 LA
PA
1993 OH
1994 VA
CT
1995 IN
NY
SC
1998 KY
TN
2000 FL
GA
ELECTROCUTION
TO
LETHAL GAS
ELECTROCUTION
TO
LETHAL INJECTION
NO CHANGE IN
EXECUTION
METHOD
* Year these states abolished the death penalty.Choice states. For example, ifa state (e.g., Massachusetts) changes from
one execution method (electrocution) to a choice between that method and a new
method (a choice between electrocution and lethal injection in 1982), the new method
(lethal injection) only is shown in the Table.
Note: Statutory and case law documentation for each state in Tables 2 & 3 may be
found in Denno, auqra note 2. at 439-64; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 1431.220 (Michie 1998); TENN.
CODE ANN. 1 40-23-114 (1998); LaGrande v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999)
(California and Arizona); 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 00-2 (West); H. B. 1284,2000 Sess.
(Ga. 2000).
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TABLE 4
NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTROCUTION AND LETHAL INJECTION
EXECUTIONS IN TWO-YEAR INTERVALS:
1976-2000"
YEARS ELECTROCUTION LETHAL INJECTION TOTAL
1976-1977 0 0 0
1978-1979 1 0 1
(1.00) (0.00)
1980-1981 1 0 1(1.00) (0.00)
1982-1983 5 1 6
1 (0.33) (0.17)
194-1985 27 12 39
(0.69) (0.31)
1986-1917 23 18 41
(0.56) (0.44)
1968-1989 15 11 26
(0.53) (0.42)
1990-1991 18 18 36
(0.50) (0.50)
1992-193 18 47 65
(0.28) (0.72)
1994-1995 13 72 85
(0.15) (0.85)
1996-1997 13 104 117
(0.11) (019)
199-1999 10 146 156
(0.06) (0.94)
2000 3 29 32
(0.09) (0.91)
TOTAL 147 458 605
(1977-2000) (0.24) (0.76)
Deuah PuaIly Information Cantor, &ecud" Sh 1976 by YiAw (visited May 8, 2000)
4UpJ/ww.ed&Laofrdpfacmte JnWl> Frmn 1976-2000, eczudtns m odimeods (bangin. shooting.
and lethal gs) coasihitd 2.71% of the total nmber of mmcuiom. Executims for the yea 2000 include up to Ma 8,
2000. Seid
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TABLE 8*
BOTCHED ELECTROCUTION
EXECUTIONS FOLLOWING
Gregg v. Georgia, 423 U.S. 153 (1976)
1. John Spenkelink, May 25, 1979, Florida:
It took three separate jolts of electricity spread over five minutes to kill Spenkelink. After the first
jolt, smoke filled the room and a three-inch wound scorched on his right leg.
2. Frank J. Coppola, August 10, 1982, Virginia:
After a second jolt ofelectrical current, the death chamber filled with the smell and sizzle of burning
as Coppola's head and leg burst into flames.
3. John Louis Evans III, April 22, 1983, Alabama:
Three separate jolts over 14 minutes were required to kill Evans. Flames erupted from the electrode
tied to his leg, and smoke was seen coming from his head and leg.
4. Robert W. Williams, December 14,1983, Louisiana:
When the electricity was applied, smoke and sparks appeared from Williams's head. Witnesses
reported the smell of "burning flesh and "excessive burning."
5. Alpha Otis Stephens, December 12, 1984, Georgia:
It took two two-minute jolts of 2,080-volt electricity, eight minutes apart, to kill Stephens. After the
first jolt, doctors had to wait six minutes for the body to cool down before examining it. During this
time, Stephens took about 23 breaths.
6. William E. Vandiver, October 16, 1985, Indiana:
Indiana's seventy-two year old electric chair took seventeen minutes and five jolts of electricity to
kill Vandiver.
7. Alvin Moore, June 9, 1987, Louisiana:
When examined after his execution, Moore was severely burned on the top of his head and his
epidermis was found to be missing in a wide circular pattern.
8. Wayne Robert Felde, March 15, 1988, Louisiana:
Felde's body evidenced severe third and fourth degree bums. His leg was mutilated, his skin was
coming loose, and "chunks of skin" had been "burned off the left side of his head... revealing his
skull bone."
9. Horace F. Dunkins, July 14, 1989, Alabama:
An incorrectly wired chair took nineteen minutes to kill the mentally retarded Dunkins.
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10. Jesse Joseph Tafero, May 4,1990, Florida:
For four minutes, the executioner applied three 2,000-voltjolts of electricity, causing flames to shoot
from Tafero's head. The medical examiner could not determine whether Tafero survived the first two
jolts.
11. Robert T. Boggs, July 19, 1990, Virginia:
Boggs required two fifty-five second applications of 2,500-volts of electricity.
12. Wilbert Lee Evans, October 17,-1990, Virginia:
During the execution, blood poured from Evans's eyes and nose. Witnesses heard an audible moan,
suggesting suffering.
13. Derick Lynn Peterson, August 22, 1991, Virginia:
Peterson's death occurred after thirteen minutes and two separate jolts of electricity. After the first
series of jolts, Peterson's heart appeared to still be beating.
14. Roger Keith Coleman, May 20, 1992, Virginia:
Executioners applied two 1,700-volt jolts to kill Coleman. A witness spoke of smoke coming
from Coleman's leg during the execution.
15. Gregory Resnover, December 8, 1994, Indiana:
When the electricity was applied, Resnover rose suddenly "from his chair in a giant spasm...
His head jerked back and smoke and spark-like flames came out of the top of his head."
16. Jerry White, December 4, 1995, Florida:
There were reports that White lunged and screamed during his execution.
17. Larry Lonchar, November 14, 1996, Georgia:
Lonchar moaned and "seemed to gasp for air" as the executioner applied twojolts of 2,000 volts each
to Lonchar's body before he was pronounced dead.
18. Pedro Medina, March 25, 1997, Florida:
"Blue and orange flames up to a foot long shot from the right side of Mr. Medina's head and flickered
for 6 to 10 seconds, filling the execution chamber with smoke."
19. Allen Lee Davis, July 8, 1999, Florida:
After being jolted with 2,300 volts, blood poured from Davis' face, and soaked a large portion of
his shirt. Testimony indicated that the strap placed across Davis' mouth hindered his breathing and
partially asphyxiated him prior to and during the electrocution.
Documentation for each botched electrocution can be found in Denno, supra note 5, at 664-74, and Denno, supra note
2 at 412-24, as supplemented by Provenzano v. Moore, 744 Sold 413, 433-35 (Fla. 1999) (Shaw, J., dissenting)
(describing Allen Lee Davis execution).
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